Foreign Direct Investment and Growth in Transition Economies by Aleksynska, Mariya et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Foreign Direct Investment and Growth in
Transition Economies
Mariya Aleksynska and James Gaisford and William Kerr
Economics Education and Research Consortium, University of
Calgary, University of Saskatchewan
June 2003
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7668/
MPRA Paper No. 7668, posted 12. March 2008 01:43 UTC
  
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH 
IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
 
Mariya Aleksynska 
Economic Education and Research Consortium 
National University “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” 
Kiev, Ukraine 
James Gaisford 
Department of Economics 
University of Calgary 
Calgary, Canada 
 
and 
William Kerr 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, Canada 
 
 
November 2003 
 
 
Abstract: 
Recent studies of developing countries have suggested that the effectiveness of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) as spur to economic growth depends on the availability of “human capital” 
or skilled labour in a host country.  In other words, it is primarily the synergy between FDI and 
human capital — rather than FDI itself — that acts as a strong stimulant to growth.  Since many 
transition economies such as Ukraine have abundant human capital, this implies that policies that 
encourage FDI may be very beneficial in facilitating economic restructuring and stimulating 
growth.  This paper provides a thorough empirical investigation of this issue by examining the 
experience of Ukraine and other transitional economies.   
The paper provides an overview of Ukraine’s experience with FDI and growth before 
systematically analyzing the connection between these variables for a panel of transition 
economies. While the paper finds deficiencies in earlier work examining the synergy between 
FDI and human capital, it finds interesting evidence that is consistent with the synergy 
hypothesis for transition economies. Further, the analysis also suggests that there is a 
complementary — rather than substitute — relationship between FDI and domestic investment.  
Thus, the presence of FDI may provide new learning opportunities for those making domestic 
investments and visa versa. The possibility that it is not large flows of FDI that cause high 
economic growth rates, but strong growth that acts as a magnet for FDI is also investigated.  
While the paper shows that there is little empirical evidence of such reverse causation in 
transition economies, it also reveals that there is little evidence that FDI stimulates economic 
growth beyond the current year.  This lack of persistence in the benefits of FDI in transition 
economies suggests that there may be room for policy initiatives to increase the efficacy of 
FDI. 
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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND 
GROWTH 
IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES* 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an empirical examination of the linkage between 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and economic growth in transition economies. For virtually all 
these countries, and for Ukraine in particular, the issue of economic growth is paramount. Recent 
theoretical developments in the area of economic growth suggest that successful developing 
countries were able to grow in a large part due to the “catch-up” process arising from acquiring 
more modern technology (Borenzstein et al, 1998). One of the major channels of access to 
advanced technologies appears to have been foreign direct investment. Despite a seemingly 
positive association between FDI and growth, however, the empirical literature has not reached a 
consensus on whether growth leads to FDI or FDI leads to growth. Campos (2002, pp. 398) warns 
that:“…a closer examination of the attendant empirical evidence disappoints all but the most 
fervent believer.”  Similarly, de Mello (1999, 148) cautions that: “whether FDI can be deemed to 
be a catalyst for output growth, capital accumulation, and technological progress seems to be a less 
controversial hypothesis in theory that in practice.” Aside from Campos (2002), however, little 
research has yet been done on the FDI-growth connection for transition economies.  
There are several ways that FDI can stimulate economic growth. First, through capital 
accumulation, FDI is expected to be growth enhancing in that more new inputs are incorporated 
into production (Buckley, 2002). Output growth may additionally result from a wider range of 
intermediate goods in FDI-related production (Feenstra and Markusen, 1994). Second, FDI is 
considered to be an important source of technological change and human capital augmentation 
(Buckley, 2002). Further, FDI leads to technology diffusion through the transmission of ideas and 
new technologies, productivity spillovers, sharing and implementation of know-how, and 
knowledge transfers (Borensztein et al.,1998). Technological change occurs not only within the 
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FDI-recipient firm, but also in the economy overall, due to the spillover effects or positive 
externalities. Some studies (Schoors et al, 2002) find that whenever firms in open sectors are 
owned domestically, they tend to compete on the basis of cheap labour because productivity is not 
very high. This is in contrast to the foreign-owned firms in the same sectors, which hire more 
expensive labour, but benefit from higher productivity. Cross-sector, or indirect, effects are also 
present. Whenever labour migrates and or knowledge is transmitted from sector to sector, 
technology diffusion occurs. In addition, highly productive foreign firms may stimulate healthy 
competition in the domestic market. Further, since the foreign-owned firms typically produce high-
quality products, they require their domestic partners to comply with this quality, eventually 
driving up production standards of firms from different sectors of the economy (Blomstrom et 
al.,1998). The resultant increase in economic activity may increase growth either directly or 
indirectly by stimulating increased domestic investment (de Mello, 1997). 
FDI is believed to be especially important for transition economies. At the onset of 
transition, all countries were far from the international best-practices technological frontier, but 
unlike many developing countries, they did not start from the scratch. Campos (2002) has argued 
that economies in transition had a so-called “enabling environment”, which should allow them to 
realize large potential gains from FDI. Despite the unarguable fact that most transition economies 
were highly endowed with human capital, market institutions and infrastructure were lacking. 
Much of the infrastructure, as well as the capital stock more generally, embodied antiquated 
technologies and was in a state of disrepair. In this context, FDI would seem to offer access to both 
modern technology and additional physical capital. Since transition requires a very thorough 
retooling of the capital stock, the speed of the transition itself may be related to the ability of a 
country to stimulate capital inflows (Garibaldi et al., 2002). Balatsky (1999) suggests that a 
significant foreign-owned sector may even help a transition economy ward off temporary shocks or 
minor recessions because they are less vulnerable to domestic multiplier effects. Calvo et al. 
(1996) conjecture that significant capital inflows to one or more of the more advanced countries in 
the region such as Hungary, Czech Republic, and Russia may generate externalities for the 
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neighboring countries. Other potential benefits of FDI include: increased consumer choice; 
consumption smoothing by households; support for pension funds and retirement accounts; and 
improved tax collection on the local and state levels (see Calvo et al.,1996)). 
Not all researchers are so sanguine with regard to the impact of FDI on growth prospects a 
host economy. Some authors such as Schoors et al. (2002) and Blomstrom et al. (1998) argue that 
at least in the initial stages of development or transition, FDI could have a negative impact on the 
recipient economy. If domestic firms are so unproductive in comparison with foreign-owed firms, 
the former may be driven out of business leading to a so-called “market stealing” effect. While the 
empirical findings of Schoors et al. (2002) for Hungary, indicate that the positive effects of FDI on 
growth dominate, this result does not necessarily extend to other transition economies. Calvo et al., 
1996, 124) identify other potentially harmful macroeconomic effects of large FDI inflows such as: 
“…rapid monetary expansion, inflationary pressures, real exchange rate appreciation and widening 
current account deficits.” They also warn that FDI may lead to “booms and busts in capital 
inflows”, and, consequently, to economic upswings and downswings in the host country. 
Therefore, policies that reduce the vulnerability to cyclically based FDI decisions may be 
warranted. 
Borensztein et al. (1998) examine the empirical connection between growth and FDI. They 
examine 69 countries, consisting of OECD, Latin American and several African countries, over 
two decades, 1970-79 and 1980-89. While they consistently find that FDI has significant positive 
impact on economic growth in host countries, their main conclusion is that human capital and FDI 
display complementarily effects.  Further, there is a threshold level of human capital, which is 
needed for FDI to contribute to growth. The impact of FDI on host economies, therefore, may be 
very different, depending on level of human capital development, and may even be negative in a 
country where this level is low. This finding is corroborated by de Mello (1997), who also 
concludes that an increase in the growth can only be achieved provided there is sufficient human 
capital in an economy.  
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Campos (2002), on the other hand, finds no empirical evidence of a threshold level of 
human capital in transition countries. Campos explains this difference by speculating that in 
transition economies the level of human capital is above the minimum threshold level. Campos’s 
principal hypothesis is that transitional economies have the necessary level of physical and human 
capital, but are behind developed countries in terms of technology. Another important study in the 
field, which focuses on the FDI-growth relationship at a regional level for provinces of China, was 
conducted by Buckley et al. (2002). While the authors find a positive relation between FDI and 
growth, again there is no evidence of a threshold level of human capital after which FDI becomes 
more effective. 
2. Overview of Foreign Direct Investment in Transition Economies 
Many transition countries, including Ukraine, have attempted to stimulate economic 
activity through various means, including policies aimed at promoting FDI and technology 
transfer. To this end, transition countries have abandoned socialistic and inflationary policies, 
moved away from discriminatory taxation and restrictive legislation, and attempted to establish a 
record of respecting private property and maintaining free markets. In many countries, these free-
market policies eventually stimulated both foreign and domestic investment.  Further, in recent 
years there has been a tendency for macroeconomic stability to improve and for increased rates of 
economic growth. Hence, it is important to establish whether the observed growth can be 
systematically linked to an increased inflow of FDI over the period of transition. Prior to that, 
however, it is helpful to review the aggregate data on FDI inflows to transition economies.  
Conventionally, economies in transition are divided into three sub-groups: the countries of 
Central Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Romania, Poland), the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
or CIS (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). 
Figure 1 summarizes FDI inflows to these three groups of countries over the period from 1992 to 
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1999. In the subsequent analysis, we use data for the years 1991 and 2000, but because of 
incomplete data for several countries, the graph reflects only the truncated period. The data for 
Croatia, however, only begins in 1993, and that for Macedonia only in 1994.  The largest share of 
FDI went to Central European countries but FDI inflows were generally increasing to all three 
groups of countries over the period of study. 
Figure 2 presents time trends for FDI. There are several important reasons for separating 
Russia and the remainder of the CIS. The size of the Russian economy represents 30 to 40 percent 
of the entire transition group, in terms of both GDP and population (Garibaldi et al., 2002). 
Moreover, Russia is the only net exporter of capital over the period of study (Hirvensalo, 2000). 
Overall, FDI seems to exhibit similar patterns across country groups, following an upward trend, 
with Central European (CE) group attracting by far the largest inflows of FDI and Russia 
experiencing large fluctuations in 1997-1998.  
Figure 3 presents the FDI inflow into Ukraine in aggregate and in per capita terms over the 
period 1992-2000. The large decline in FDI in 1999 appears to be directly linked with the financial 
crisis that occurred in the second half of the year. The situation improved rapidly, however, and by 
2000 FDI was increasing again.  Figure 4, shows the cross-country distribution of FDI for 18 
transition countries. The FDI attracted by various transition economies shows marked differences 
with Ukraine near the bottom whether FDI is measured relative to GDP or population. The left-
hand panel, which presents FDI as a percentage of GDP, may be somewhat misleading. By this 
criterion, Estonia and Kazakhstan are the leaders in attracting FDI and countries such as the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia, and Moldova outperform several countries in Central Europe. While 
the high inflows for Kazakhstan can be, in part, attributed to its rich natural resource endowment, 
Garibaldi et al. (2002) suggest that the puzzling results may be due to problems with measuring 
GDP and its conversion to US dollars. To reduce this source of confusion, one of the remedies 
recommend by Garabaldi et al. (2002) is to use population as the adjustment factor. Thus, the 
right-hand side of the Figure 4 shows the result of this normalization: Central European and Baltic 
countries now occupy leading positions, whereas Kazakhstan leads the CIS group. 
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While the raw data on FDI in transition economies such as Ukraine is clearly interesting in 
its own right, it is vitally important to consider how, and indeed whether, FDI is linked to 
economic growth. We now turn to this question, first by considering the underlying theory and 
then by embarking on an empirical analysis. 
3. Key Variables in Growth Theory 
The development of endogenous growth theory by Romer (1990, 2001) and others has 
provided a theoretical context that has stimulated research on the impact of FDI on growth. It is 
now conventional to derive empirical estimating equations for economic growth from an 
augmented production function in which FDI enters as one of the inputs. It is frequently postulated 
that aggregate output measured by real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) depends on: 
· the current state of technology 
· physical capital (domestic capital stock)  
· foreign capital (foreign direct investment) 
· labour 
· a series of ancillary variables including policy variables 
Borensztein et al. (1998) suggest a version of the production function in which the primarily inputs 
are human and physical capital. They treat foreign capital differently from domestic capital 
because the latter may expand the variety of intermediate and/or capital goods and because FDI 
may act as an important conduit for technology transfer. They also allow for the possibility of 
synergies between human capital and FDI, so that a higher level of human capital in a host 
economy makes FDI more effective in stimulating economic growth. Consequently, economic 
growth, which is measured as the percentage change in real per-capita GDP over the preceding 
year, depends on: 
· initial level of per-capita GDP 
· human capital 
· physical capital (domestic investment)  
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· the direct effect of foreign capital (FDI) 
· the synergy between FDI and human capital 
· a series of ancillary variables including policy variables 
This list of causal factors drives the choice of explanatory variables for our empirical analysis. 
The first explanatory variable that we incorporate is the natural logarithm of the 
purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per-capita GDP for 1989 as calculated by de Mello et al. (1997). 
The initial level of purchasing-power-parity (PPP) adjusted GDP per capita is consistently included 
as an explanatory variable in endogenous growth theory because it incorporates the possibility of a 
convergence effect .  The initial level of real per-capita GDP is expected to be negatively related to 
growth, since economies with lower levels of per capita income will tend to grow faster in per 
capita terms (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). 
Our second explanatory variable is the ratio of secondary school enrolment to the school-
age population in 1989 as presented by Fisher and Sahay (2000). Following Mankiw et al. (1992), 
it has become conventional to use the secondary school enrollment ratio as a proxy for human 
capital investment. However, as pointed out by Temple (1999), there are some conceptual 
difficulties with the use of school enrolment data. These rates were once regarded as one of the 
most robust and satisfactory variables in the growth literature, but in fact, they only rarely 
correspond to the human capital variables highlighted in theoretical models. Further, it is not 
always clear whether rates of school enrollment are intended to represent a flow of investment in 
human capital or the stock. Due to data limitations, initial school enrolment ratios are still widely 
used as a proxy for human capital, and are used here as well.     
In part, the economic transition process in the countries of Central Europe and the former 
USSR has been characterized by their so-called initial conditions. While the initial levels of per-
capita GDP and human capital are likely to be important in this respect, other variables may also be 
relevant for transition economies.  These additional candidate initial conditions include 
agriculture’s share in GDP, indices of natural resource endowment, years under communism, 
distance from Duesseldorf, and foreign debt at the onset of transition. In this paper, we do not 
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include these additional conditions for two reasons.  First, Fisher and Sahay (2000) do not find that 
the additional initial conditions are significant explanatory variables.  Second, with the panel data 
that we use, the additional initial conditions simply turn into an extended set of time-invariant 
constants for each country.   
The third explanatory variable is FDI, which is measured as the ratio of gross capital 
formation to GDP, and the fourth is domestic investment, which is measured as the ratio of the 
gross inflow of FDI to GDP. As suggested by de Mello (1997), it is important to be consistent by 
using the flows of both domestic and foreign investment, or the stocks of both domestic and 
foreign capital. Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) approximate the rate of growth of the domestic 
capital stock by the share of investment in GDP. Accordingly, they replace the rates of change in 
domestic and foreign capital inputs by the share of domestic investment and foreign direct 
investment in GDP. Following this proposition, FDI, domestic investment and other variables will 
also be defined in similar terms in this paper. The ratio of FDI to GDP, thus, represents the direct 
effect of FDI on economic growth in our analysis.1 To explore possible synergies and or crowding 
this FDI variable is also interacted multiplicatively with the human capital variable and, also, with 
domestic investment. 
The list of explanatory variables that may be determinants of growth also includes a series 
of ancillary variables including policy-related variables. In the original work of Borensztein et al. 
(1998), this set of variables encompasses government consumption as well as foreign exchange 
and trade distortions (e.g., a black market premium and a parallel foreign exchange market 
premium).  They also suggest regional dummy variables. Due to data limitations, our analysis will 
include only the ratio government consumption to GDP and the initial black market premium. 
According to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), the black-market premium proxies government 
induced distortions in markets and it is expected to affect growth rates negatively. The coefficient 
on government consumption may be of either sign. In the short run, an increase in government 
expenditures can lead to an increased economic activity and greater growth. In the long run, a 
negative association with growth is expected because government consumption does not have 
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direct impact on private productivity and it can lower savings via the distortionary effects of 
taxation or government expenditure (Barro, 1991). Another variable that is frequently included in 
growth equations is the terms of trade, or, alternatively, the ratio of the current account balance to 
GDP. In this paper, we use the latter.  Since a larger current account balance typically provides a 
short-run macroeconomic stimulus to economic activity, any effect on growth is expected to be 
positive. 
Other policy variables that attempt to reflect the economic and political situation and the 
progress of reforms include various indices computed mainly by international organizations such 
as European Bank for Development and Research. In the estimations, we considered indices of 
trade liberalization, banking reform, freedom, and market perceptions of “country risk” (the latter 
being borrowed from Garibaldi et al. (2002)). However, these variables did not to perform well in 
estimations. The final set of variables used in the empirical part of this paper is summarized in the 
Appendix in Table A1. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis, which uses data on 17 transition economies, is based closely on 
Borensztein et al. (1998).2 The data is discussed further in the Appendix. Our analysis focuses 
primarily on three specifications of the empirical model.  The first examines the direct effect of 
FDI on growth, the second investigates synergies between FDI and human capital, and the third 
allows for interactions between FDI and domestic investment. While we consider different 
specifications, we keep all other explanatory variables the same to make the results more 
comparable. After some specification search and following a “general-to-specific” approach, we 
retain the three variables suggested by theory: domestic investment, initial human capital and 
initial GDP. Most of the policy variables, and especially transition and structural indices did not 
perform well. These variables turned out to be insignificant and/or affected the signs or 
significance levels of other variables. The only policy variables that seemed to have a statistically 
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significant impact on growth were the black market premium, government consumption and the 
trade variable.  Thus, these variables were left in the final specifications.  
For each of the three general specifications of the model, three different methods of 
estimation are used to check the robustness of the results in response to potential econometric 
problems arising from the empirical estimation.  These econometric issues are discussed in the 
Appendix. In Tables 1-4, column 1 shows the results of robust Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation treating the sample as pooled data. Column 2 shows the results of Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) estimation treating the sample as panel data with random effects. Finally, Column 3 
shows the results of Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation.  
4.1. The Direct Effect of FDI on Growth 
Table 1 shows the results of the specification that allows for direct effects of FDI on 
economic growth but does not include possible synergies with human capital.  The key variable of 
interest, FDI, has a positive effect on economic growth that is statistically significant in both the 
OLS and IV estimations, but statistically insignificant with GLS estimation. When interpreting the 
magnitude of the direct effect of FDI on growth, one should bear in mind the measurement units of 
the variables. The dependent variable, growth, was measured in decimal form, as the ratio of the 
change in GDP to the level of GDP, in order to be compatible with the dependent variables. FDI, 
domestic investment, and government consumption were each measured as a ratio with respect to 
the GDP in the corresponding year. Thus, the coefficient on FDI in the OLS (robust) estimation 
indicates that an increase in FDI as a proportion of GDP by one percentage point would increase 
the growth rate by almost 0.51 percentage points. In the IV estimation, growth increases even more 
dramatically by 1.6 percentage points.   
For all three methods of estimation, the sign on the initial GDP variable is negative, as 
expected. This reflects the convergence effect where countries with lower initial per-capita 
incomes are expected to grow faster. This variable was significant at least at the10% level in all 
three versions of this specification.  The initial black-market premium has a highly significant 
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negative effect on growth in all versions, while government consumption has a positive effect, 
which is statistically significant in the first OLS and GLS versions.  As discussed earlier, the 
positive sign of the coefficient on government consumption is quite acceptable in a short-run 
context.  Although human capital and domestic investment are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels, we retain them in the model as theoretically important variables. Domestic 
investment has a negative effect on growth in the IV estimation, but this is not statistically 
significant. While the coefficient on the current account to GDP ratio also bears a counter-intuitive 
negative sign for the first two methods of estimation, this variable has a statistically insignificant 
effect on growth regardless of the method chosen. 
4.2. FDI and Human Capital: are there Synergies? 
The positive direct effect of FDI on growth may arise because we have omitted synergies 
with human capital from the first specification.  Consequently, in the second specification shown in 
Table 2, the direct effect of FDI on growth is replaced with the product between FDI and initial 
human capital in order to capture possible synergies between the two variables. Once again, all 
three different estimation methods convey a similar message, indicating the overall robustness of 
the results. Quite strikingly, only two variables are persistently significant in all estimations: the 
synergy term and the black market premium. Under OLS, government consumption and initial per-
capita GDP would also be significant at the 11% and 12% levels respectively.  While domestic 
investment remains statistically insignificant in all three versions of this specification, it does have 
the expected positive sign in the OLS and GLS versions. 
The significance of the interaction term is an important result since it implies that FDI and 
human capital exhibit synergies or complementary spillover effects in transition economies, which 
were not found by Campos (2002). The positive interaction between FDI and the level of human 
capital indicates that FDI will have a stronger positive effect on economic growth when the 
existing stock of human capital is high. As suggested by theory, the benefits of the flow of 
advanced technology associated with FDI in a recipient economy may be dependent on its stock of 
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human capital or “absorptive capability”.  In Ukraine, where the proxy for initial human capital is a 
91% high-school participation rate for 1989, an increase in FDI as a proportion of GDP by one 
percentage point would raise the growth rate quite substantially.  In both the OLS and GLS 
versions, the growth rate would rise by 0.49 percentage points and in the IV version it would rise 
by 0.40 percentage points.  
4.3.  FDI and Domestic Investment: Crowding out or Further Synergies? 
The potential synergy with human capital points to the possibility of further 
complementary or substitute interactions involving FDI. In the third model shown in Table 3, we 
consider whether FDI crowds out the positive effect of domestic investment on growth.  Following 
Buckley et al. (2002), a negative coefficient on the interaction term given by the product of 
domestic investment and FDI would indicate crowding out between the two variables, while a 
positive coefficient would indicate a synergy or complementary effect. While the domestic 
investment variable on its own remains insignificant with all three methods of estimation, the 
interaction term in OLS and IV estimations turns out to be statistically significant and has a 
positive sign. This is additional evidence that the flow of FDI has a stronger impact on economic 
growth if a host economy has greater absorptive capacity, which is now represented by investment 
in physical rather than human capital. Moreover, in this case the magnitude of the synergy is large.  
In Ukraine, domestic investment measured by gross capital formation was on average 22% of GDP 
over the sample period. Given this ratio of domestic investment to GDP, an increase in FDI as a 
proportion of GDP by one percentage point would increase the growth rate by 0.45 percentage 
points in the OLS regression and by 0.36 percentage points in the IV regression. Hence, FDI does 
not crowd out domestic investment and, further, the two types of capital investment seem to exhibit 
strong complementary effects on growth.3 Other variables in this specification generally have the 
expected signs, though most of them are insignificant.  
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4.4. The Direct Effects of FDI versus Synergies 
Borensztein et al. (1998) suggest the inclusion of a direct effect of FDI on growth in 
addition to the synergy term on FDI and human capital. The significant positive sign on the 
synergy term in Table 2, for example, may simply be an artifact of the omission of FDI itself. 
Unfortunately, the data is such that discriminating between the models in this way is problematic 
as shown by the specification of the model in Table 4. In all three versions, both the direct effect of 
FDI and the synergy between human capital and FDI are statistically insignificant and, 
paradoxically, the synergy has a negative impact on FDI. In the OLS and GLS specifications, 
however, the direct and effect and the synergy are jointly significant at 5% and 10% respectively.  
Even for a country such as Ukraine with a high 91% secondary-school participation rate, we 
emphasize that the combined effect of an increase in FDI on economic growth through both 
channels is positive in all three specifications. Nevertheless, there are strong statistical reasons for 
being wary of the results of this variant of the model. 
There is a very high degree of correlation between the FDI and the interaction between FDI 
and human capital (i.e., the correlation coefficient is 0.99), which leads to the statistical problem of 
multicollinearity in the estimation results. The high degree of correlation is not surprising.  Since 
human capital variable is defined as initial school enrollment, it is invariant with respect to time 
and quite similar across most countries in the sample. Further, the patterns of FDI across time are 
also similar across countries. In presence of high multicollinearity, the estimated coefficients 
remain consistent and unbiased, but their variances become very large. This leads to a lack of 
precision in the estimates such that the coefficients may have the wrong signs or implausible 
magnitudes (Greene, 2000; Kennedy, 1998). Consequently, neither the lack of significance of the 
direct effect and synergy effect nor the paradoxical sign on the synergy effect should be 
particularly surprising. 
Similar statistical problems arise if we attempt to discriminate between the direct effect of 
FDI and the synergy between FDI and domestic investment.  Although current domestic 
investment, unlike initial human capital, varies over time, the correlation between FDI and the term 
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that reflects the interaction between FDI and domestic investment is still very high (i.e., the 
correlation coefficient is 0.96). This suggests that multicollinearity will again be problem.  
Consequently, standard inference tests would be invalid and precise conclusions about the effect of 
any variable could not be drawn. For this reason, we leave the results of this specification to Table 
A4 in the Appendix. Of course, it would also be possible to estimate a specification that would nest 
all of the outlined specifications and include both interaction terms simultaneously. Since such 
specification would again suffer from multicollinearity, these results are once more relegated to 
Table A4 in the Appendix. In both of the extra specifications reported in the Appendix, the 
coefficients on all variables of primary interest are statistically insignificant.  
The multicolinearity problem is quite important in the light of the debate present in the 
economic literature about the existence of a threshold level of human capital in a host economy 
after which FDI becomes effective. For example, Borensztein et al. (1998) find evidence in favour 
of a synergy between FDI and human capital in developing countries because the interaction term 
is positive and significant whenever it is included. They also go on to claim that there is a threshold 
level of human capital because they find a significant positive coefficient on the interaction term 
and a negative but insignificant coefficient on FDI when both terms are included.  Meanwhile, in a 
similar regression for transition economies, Campos (2002) finds that the interaction term is 
insignificant, but the FDI term is positive and significant. Consequently, Campos hypothesizes that 
the initial human capital endowments in transition economies easily exceed any threshold level that 
is required before FDI has a positive impact on growth. Nevertheless, the results of both these 
studies appear to be questionable since neither accounts for the potentia l problem of 
multicollinearity. In our empirical work, and quite possibly the Borensztein et al. (1998) and 
Campos (2002) studies as well, it is not possible to discern the relative importance of the direct and 
synergy effects. Consequently, it is not possible to determine whether there really is a threshold 
level of human capital, after which FDI becomes effective. Although the channels remain in doubt, 
the evidence from Tables 1-3 very strongly indicates that, in transition countries such as Ukraine, 
FDI has a positive overall impact on growth that is substantial in magnitude. 
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4.5. Reverse Causality and Persistence 
The possibility that FDI is endogenous suggested the use of Instrumental Variables (IV) 
estimation and, as discussed in the Appendix, the conventional test results shown in Tables 1-4 
generally support the use of this method over OLS. This suggests that the possibility of reverse 
causation exists where news about rapid growth in a transition economy could provide a 
sufficiently strong impetus for foreign investors to relocate significant amounts of their capital. 
Granger (1980, 1987) has argued that it is possible to obtain further evidence on whether changes 
in a variable such as economic growth cause changes in another variable such as FDI. This can be 
done by considering whether lagged or previous values of growth add to the explanation of current 
FDI beyond what is explained by lagged values of FDI itself. The results of Granger causality 
testing reported in the Appendix do not support the notion that past growth acts as a magnet for 
current FDI. In other words, there is evidence that reverse causality is not a significant issue. 
Clearly, it is also possible to provide an analogous test on linkages between past levels of FDI and 
current economic growth. The results of Granger causality testing in the Appendix also show that 
the FDI inflow in the previous period does not add significantly to growth in the current period.  
While these double causation results are broadly consistent with the literature, (de Mello, 
1997; Kholdy, 1995; Campos, 2002), it is worthwhile to carefully consider the implications. On the 
one hand, the results of our previous modeling suggest that current FDI tends to have positive 
direct and/or indirect effects on current growth in a host economy.  On the other hand, Granger 
causality analysis indicates that past FDI does not have a significant persistent effect on current 
growth. While these two findings are clearly mutually consistent, it seems reasonable to be less 
than sanguine with respect to the latter result. The lack of persistence in the effect of foreign direct 
investment on growth begs the question of whether policy changes might stimulate on-going 
benefits through greater learning arising from FDI.  
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5. Conclusion 
Many countries, including developing and transition economies, have changed their 
attitude towards foreign direct investment over the past decade.  Countries have liberalized their 
policies to attract rather than repel investment from multinational enterprises (MNEs), and they 
routinely compete against one another by offering generous incentive packages. This study is an 
effort to further the understanding of the impact of foreign direct investment on economies in 
transition, and in particular, on their economic growth. The paper examines the impact of FDI in 
17 transition economies and considers potential channels through which this impact occurs. The 
study also exposes econometric problems that may have biased the conclusions of earlier research.  
The paper provides strong empirical evidence that FDI promotes growth on an overall 
basis, but it suggests that it is not possible to discern the relative importance of direct effects and 
synergies. It should be emphasized that the data is compatible with the hypothesis that the so-called 
“absorptive capacity” of host economies for FDI is important. For example, the empirical evidence 
is consistent with a synergy between FDI and human capital. Workers with a higher level of 
education may be able to take greater advantage of the technology transfer occasioned by FDI. The 
empirical evidence is also consistent with a positive synergy between FDI and domestic investment 
and is strongly against the contrary hypothesis that FDI crowds-out or reduces the impact of 
domestic investment on growth in transition economies. Further, positive synergy with domestic 
investment appears to be of a much larger magnitude. This synergy may arise because FDI 
stimulates competition in the host country or because nationals are exposed to successful practices, 
made aware of modern technologies, and shown new profitable opportunities. Moreover, the 
empirical evidence of a synergy between FDI and domestic investment in transition economies 
appears to be highly consistent with the positive spillovers between different types of intermediate 
and capital goods in many theoretical models of endogenous growth.  
Empirical analysis also shows that past FDI has a negligible persistent effect on current 
economic growth and visa versa. This somewhat disturbing result suggests that nationals may be 
able to make a better use of transferred resources and adopt practices that would allow foreign 
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investment to be more long-lived. Further, it is somewhat puzzling that past growth does not seem 
to induce foreigners invest in transitional economies. Plausibly, this result may have arisen because 
growth was very sporadic over the period of study in many transition countries.  It is also possible 
that investors were primarily driven by other transition considerations such as economic and 
political reforms, stabilization policies, and the creation of a good investment climate.  
Our results strongly suggest that countries should avoid policies that directly or indirectly 
deter FDI.  Further, the presence of synergies indicates that policies aimed at encouraging FDI may 
be warranted. As emphasized by Blomstrom et al. (2003), “… incentives should ideally not be of 
an ex ante type that is granted and paid out prior to the investment, but should instead promote 
those activities that create a potential for spillovers. In particular, they include education, training, 
and R&D activities, as well as linkages between foreign and local firms” (p. 19). When incentives 
are based on the performance, they may affect not only the flow of new investment, but also the 
entire stock of investment. Taking into account their broad scope, Blomstrom et al. (2003) suggest 
that such investment incentives should be considered part of the economy’s innovation and growth 
policies rather than a policy area that is only of relevance for foreign investors.  
Designing efficient incentive program may not be easy. For example, policies such as 
subsidies to inward FDI are usually justified on the ground that significant spillover benefits arise 
in terms of technology and skills transferred. Other examples of government policy targeted at 
attracting FDI include fiscal incentives, such as tax holidays and import duty exemptions to 
investment allowances, and accelerated depreciation (Morisset, 2003). If such policies are pursued 
in isolation, however, various distortions may arise.  These include: favoring primarily short-term 
investment; rewarding the founding of new firms rather than investment in existing firms; and 
discriminating against investment that relies on capital that depreciates slowly. Moreover, such 
policies may result in favoring foreign investors at the expense of the state and the welfare of 
domestic citizens. Further, the potential spillover benefits can only be realized by domestic firms if 
they have ability and incentives to invest in absorbing these foreign technologies and skills. Hence, 
to encourage FDI spillovers, it is frequently advisable support education, banking, transportation 
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and communications infrastructure, and investment by local firms as well. With such an multi-
faceted approach, a country will not only be more attractive to MNEs, but it is also “likely to be 
rewarded with increasing overall investment as well as with more capital inflows”(Hausmann et 
al., 2000; emphasis added).  
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Endnotes
                                                 
*  The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of Professors 
Peter Kennedy, Magdalena Sokalska and Tom Coupe on previous versions of this project. 
The authors, however, are responsible for any shortcomings in the current paper. 
1  There is a potential deficiency with the measure of FDI, which is available in the balance-of-
payment statistics. Since a part of a multinational enterprise’s investment may be financed 
through debt or equity issues raised in the host-country’s capital market, the FDI may be 
understated and the associated coefficients may be overestimated. Given that the bias is 
relatively uniform across the countries in this sample, the qualitative results are not likely to be 
greatly affected. 
2  The 17 countries in the unbalanced panel are: Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Macedonia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Romania, Poland, 
Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic. 
3  The fact that the interaction term is not statistically significant in the IV estimation raises a 
potential concern regarding the robustness of the results. In theory, GLS estimation would 
produce the best linear unbiased estimates. As implementation of GLS requires the use of the 
estimated rather than the true variance-covariance matrix of disturbances, the estimates 
obtained through GLS in practice may be inefficient although they remain unbiased. 
Meanwhile, robust OLS estimation has, as its end result, the White heteroscedasticity-
consistent estimator (Greene, 2000), which is efficient. Consequently, the estimate of a single 
coefficient produced by robust OLS tends to be more powerful than that for GLS. 
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Figure 1.  Foreign Direct Investment Inflows, 1992-1999 (USD millions) 
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Data Source: Garibaldi et al. (2001) 
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Figure 2.  FDI Flows by Groups of Countries, 1992-1999 (USD millions) 
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Figure 3.  FDI into Ukraine 
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Figure 4.  Cross-Country Distribution of FDI, 1992-1999 
As a percentage of GDP
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Table 1. The Direct Effect of FDI on Economic Growth 
 
Independent 
Variable 
OLS for Pooled 
Data (robust) 
GLS for Panel 
Data 
IV for Panel  
Data 
Initial (1989) Per-
Capita GDP 
-0.1361 
(0.09)* 
-0.0082 
(0.02)** 
-0.0644 
(0.10)* 
Initial (1989) 
Human Capital 
0.1018 
(0.27) 
0.0209 
(0.75) 
0.1005 
(0.36) 
Domestic 
Investment 
0.0483 
(0.75) 
0.0709 
(0.51) 
-0.0662 
(0.72) 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
0.5069 
(0.02)** 
0.1303 
(0.47) 
1.6152 
(0.00)** 
Government 
Consumption 
0.3411 
(0.05)** 
0.1929 
(0.09)* 
0.0632 
(0.76) 
Current Account 
 
-0.0288 
(0.51) 
-0.0225 
(0.50) 
0.0084 
(0.81) 
Black Market 
Premium 
-0.0001 
(0.00)** 
-0.0001 
(0.00)** 
-0.0001 
(0.01)** 
Constant 0.1526 
(0.74) 
-0.0212 
(0.94) 
0.0453 
(0.93) 
Observations 138 138 121 
F-test for common intercept: F(16, 117) = 1.13; P-value: 0.22 
Breusch and Pagan LM test for random effects: ?2(1) = 0.00; P-value: 0.97 
Hausman specification test: ?2(4) = 3.86; P-value: 0.43 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity: ?2(1) = 28.06; P-value: 0.00 
Hausman test: ?2(6) = 161.20; P-value: 0.00 
Note: p-values in parentheses; * - significance at 10%; ** - significance at 5%. 
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Table 2. Synergies between FDI and Human Capital  
 
Independent 
Variable 
OLS for Pooled 
Data (robust) 
GLS for Panel 
Data 
IV for Panel  
Data 
Initial (1989) Per-
Capita GDP 
-0.0148 
(0.58) 
-0.1279 
(0.55) 
-0.0727 
(0.79) 
Initial (1989) 
Human Capital 
0.0880 
(0.34) 
0.0875 
(0.32) 
0.1358 
(0.23) 
Domestic 
Investment 
0.0490 
(0.75) 
0.0501 
(0.76) 
-0.0465 
(0.79) 
FDI*Initial 
Human Capital 
0.5422 
(0.03)** 
0.5427 
(0.04)** 
0.4445 
(0.08)* 
Government 
Consumption 
0.3272 
(0.07)* 
0.3264 
 (0.07)* 
0.0387 
(0.85) 
Current Account 
 
-0.0292 
(0.53) 
-0.0291 
(0.36) 
0.0141 
(0.66) 
Black Market 
Premium 
-0.0001 
(0.00)** 
-0.0001 
(0.00)** 
-000.01 
(0.01)** 
Constant 0.0023 (0.99) 
0.1505 
(0.73) 
0.0747 
(0.90) 
Observations 138 138 121 
F-test for common intercept: F(16, 117) = 1.25; P-value: 0.24 
Breusch and Pagan LM test for random effects: ?2(1) = 0.00; P-value: 0.98 
Hausman specification test: ?2(4) = 5.89; P-value: 0.20 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity: ?2(1) = 27.90; P-value: 0.00 
Hausman test: ?2(6) = 481.75; P-value: 0.00 
Note: p-values in parentheses; * - significance at 10%; ** - significance at 5%. 
 
  — 30 — 
Table 3. Synergies between FDI and Domestic Investment 
Independent 
Variable 
OLS for Pooled 
Data (robust) 
GLS for Panel 
Data 
IV for Panel  
Data 
Initial (1989) Per-
Capita GDP 
-0.1384 
(0.51) 
-0.0121 
(0.93) 
-0.0846 
(0.77) 
Initial (1989) 
Human Capital 
0.1053 
(0.25) 
0.0202 
(0.76) 
0.1521 
(0.18) 
Domestic 
Investment 
-0.0101 
(0.95) 
0.0618 
(0.58) 
0.0133 
(0.68) 
FDI*Domestic 
Investment 
2.0044 
(0.02)** 
0.4412 
(0.54) 
1.6118 
(0.09)* 
Government 
Consumption 
0.3318 
(0.05)** 
0.1927 
(0.13) 
0.0375 
(0.85) 
Current Account 
 
-0.0299 
(0.51) 
-0.0207 
(0.53) 
0.0133 
(0.68) 
Black Market 
Premium 
-0.0001 
(0.00)** 
-0.0001 
(0.00)** 
-0.0001 
(0.01)** 
Constant 0.1705 (0.71) 
-0.0091 
(0.97) 
0.0989 
(0.86) 
Observations 138 138 121 
F-test for common intercept: F(16, 117) = 1.26; P-value: 0.23 
Breusch and Pagan LM test for random effects: ?2(1) = 0.00; P-value: 0.97 
Hausman specification test: ?2(4) = 3.47; P-value: 0.48 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity: ?2(1) = 26.72; P-value: 0.00 
Hausman test: ?2(6) = 163.62; P-value: 0.00 
Note: p-values in parentheses; * - significance at 10%; ** - significance at 5%. 
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Table 4. Direct Effects versus Synergies with Human Capital  
 
Independent 
Variable 
OLS for Pooled 
Data (robust) 
GLS for Panel 
Data 
IV for Panel  
Data 
Initial (1989) Per-
Capita GDP 
-0.0183 
(0.52) 
-0.1582 
(0.47) 
-0.1111  
(0.71) 
Initial (1989) 
Human Capital 
0.1430 
(0.20) 
0.1425 
(0.20) 
0.2077 
(0.13) 
Domestic 
Investment 
0.0432 
(0.78) 
0.0446 
(0.78) 
-0.0541 
(0.75) 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
1.8369 
(0.35) 
1.8419 
(0.42) 
2.3234 
(0.30) 
FDI*Initial 
Human Capital 
-1.4793 
(0.50) 
-1.4846 
(0.59) 
-2.1365 
(0.39) 
Government 
Consumption 
0.3826 
(0.06)* 
0.3816 
(0.04)** 
0.0844 
(0.69) 
Current Account 
 
-0.0280 
(0.54) 
-0.0279 
(0.38) 
0.0162 
(0.62) 
Black Market 
Premium 
-0.0001 
(0.00)** 
-0.0001 
(0.00)** 
-0.0001 
(0.00)** 
Constant -0.0249 (0.89) 
0.1581 
(0.72) 
0.0881 
(0.84) 
Observations 138 138 121 
F-test for common intercept: F(16, 116) = 1.38; P-value: 0.16 
Breusch and Pagan LM test for random effects: ?2(1) = 0.00; P-value: 0.85 
Hausman specification test: ?2(5) = 7.76; P-value: 0.17 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity: ?2(1) = 28.83; P-value: 0.00 
Hausman test: ?2(7) = 48.82; P-value: 0.00 
Tests for Joint 
Significance 
F(2, 129) = 3.61 
Prob>F = 0.03 
?2(2) = 5.09 
Prob> ?2 = 0.08 
?2 (2) = 1.58 
Prob> ?2 = 0.45 
Note: p-values in parentheses; * - significance at 10%; ** - significance at 
5%. 
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Appendix 
Data 
The data on macroeconomic variables for transition economies are obtained from 
international statistics, primarily the International Monetary Fund Yearbook. The overview of FDI 
and growth uses data on 25 transition economies in over a period of up to eight years, but the 
period of study is shorter for some countries due to data limitations. In the formal empirical 
modeling, it is only possible to use the data on 17 countries because the data on some variables of 
interest is missing. The variable descriptions and data sources are summarized in Table A1. 
Summary statistics for all variables are presented in Tables A1 and A2.    
Estimation Procedures 
The estimation of the results for each of the three general specifications, which are reported 
in the text in Tables 1-4, followed virtually the same pattern, and, thus, may be conveniently 
summarised.  
Step 1. Despite the numerous advantages of the use of panel data, the estimation of the 
panel requires certain statistical justification. Thus, the estimation starts with performing the triplet 
of tests, which determine whether fixed effects on panel data, random effects on panel data, or 
simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) on pooled data should be preferred. The tests applied here 
are an F-test, Breusch and Pagan LM test, and Hausman test.  Uniformly, the F-tests for all four 
specifications indicated the use of OLS on pooled data. The Breusch and Pagan LM tests also lead 
to the same conclusion. Consequently, we proceeded with simple OLS on pooled data.  
Step 2. After carrying out OLS estimation, we conduct a Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroscedasticity, using fitted values of the dependent variable (growth). The computed test 
statistics (chi-squared) for all specifications overwhelmingly reject the null hypothesis of constant 
variance. Thus, we proceed further using regressions with robust standard errors, that is, with 
“heteroscedasticity-consistent” variance-covariance matrix estimators. This corrects for the 
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influence of non-spherical errors and leads to more reliable inferences. The resulting OLS (robust) 
results are presented in first columns of Tables 1-4. 
Step 3. The finding of the heteroscedasticity on the previous step suggests that the 
heteroscedasticity was also present in the Step 1. Since the inferences about the original tests 
results are called into question by the presence of heteroscedascticity, we may want to reconsider 
panel estimation, using General Least Squares. The GLS procedure produces more efficient 
estimators by minimizing the weighted sum of squared composite residuals. The results of GLS 
estimation for the panel data are presented in second columns of Tables 1 –4.  These results are, 
actually, quite comparable to OLS robust estimation of the pooled data, producing qualitatively 
similar results.  
Step 4. OLS and GLS estimations are not the end of the story, however. One important 
aspect of the growth model used in the estimations is the possible endogeneity of the FDI variable. 
To deal with this potential problem, we use the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation. The 
instruments include the lagged value of FDI and two dummy variables: “FSU” (for the non-Baltic 
countries of former Soviet Union) and “Baltic” (for three Baltic states) being the instruments of 
choice for potentially endogenous FDI. In the IV estimation, the number of observations drops 
from 138 to 121 because of the use of lagged FDI as an instrument. The results of IV estimation for 
the panel data are presented in the third columns of the four tables.  
Step 5. It is also important to note that the instrumental variable technique is not always a 
perfect remedy for the endogeneity problem. Although the estimates obtained through using the IV 
procedure are consistent, there is a price to pay for avoiding the asymptotic bias of OLS: the 
variance-covariance matrix of the IV estimator is larger than that of the OLS estimator. Thus, the 
final step is to use a Hausman test, which checks whether the IV estimation is to be preferred to 
“IV-free” estimation. The null hypothesis of the test is that the difference in coefficients obtained 
via two types of estimation is not systematic. For all estimations based on panel data, the null is 
rejected at conventional levels of significance and thus the use of IV procedure is justified.  
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Granger Causality 
In Granger (1980, 1987) causality testing, the number of lags should be chosen such that 
white noise disturbance terms are obtained. Since our data comprise a rather short time period, a 
single one-year lag can reasonably be adopted, giving rise to the following system of equations:  
 g t  = a + g g t-1 + f Ft-1 + ut (A1) 
 Ft = b + d  g t-1 + q Ft-1 + vt  (A2) 
where gy t  and Ft  are growth and FDI series respectively; n and m denote the number of lags 
chosen so that u and v are white noise disturbance terms. To test whether FDI Granger causes 
growth, we have to test whether f ? 0, and, by analogy, to test whether growth Granger causes 
FDI, we have to test whether d ? 0. Bi-directional Granger causality is obtained if f ? 0 and d ? 0.  
In testing the first hypothesis that FDI Granger causes growth, we need only the first 
equation of the system; the second equation is irrelevant (Greene, 2000). Similarly, to test the 
second hypothesis that growth Granger causes FDI, the second equation alone is sufficient. The 
simple test for these separate cases is just a t-test. In order to draw conclusions about presence or 
absence of a bi-directional relationship, these one-sided estimates (where the only one direction at 
a time is tested) estimations may not suffice. Since we would like to test the joint hypothesis, that 
the causality is running in both directions, and that the coefficients f and d in both regressions are 
nonzero simultaneously, we need a more careful procedure. It involves estimating the system of 
two equations and then conducting the joint test on the coefficients jointly being different from 
zero. Thus, Granger causality is tested in the vector autoregressive (VAR) model. 
The results of all three estimations are summarized in Table A5. From the Table it can be 
inferred that in the regression with growth being a dependent variable (column 1), lagged FDI is 
insignificant so that FDI does not Granger cause growth. In the regression with FDI being a 
dependent variable (column 2), the lagged value of growth is insignificant as well, implying that 
that growth does not Granger cause FDI. Finally, the results of the VAR system estimation 
(columns 3 and 4) support the results of independent estimations. The joint hypothesis that the 
coefficients f and d are each equal to zero is not rejected at conventional levels.  
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Table A1. Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
    Variable 
 
Definition Source 
Growth GDP Growth rate, percentage  IMF Yearbook 2001 
Initial (1989) 
Per-Capita 
GDP 
Logarithm of the initial (1989) level 
of PPP adjusted GDP 
de Mello et al., World 
Development Indicators, 
World Economic Outlook. 
1997 
Initial (1989) 
Human Capital 
Initial (1989) ratio of secondary 
school enrollment to the school age 
population 
Fisher and Sahay, “The 
Transition Economies 
After Ten Years.” IMF 
Working Paper, 2000 
Domestic 
Investment 
Share of domestic investment in 
GDP, for a given year IMF Yearbook 2001 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
(FDI) 
Ratio of FDI to GDP Garibaldi et al., IMF Working Paper  2002 
Government 
Consumption 
Ratio of government consumption to 
GDP (serves as a policy variable) IMF Yearbook 2001 
Current 
Account  Share of current account in GDP 
IMF World Economic 
Outlook, 2000 
Black Market 
Premium 
Black market premium, initial data, 
1990, in percents 
IMF World Economic 
Outlook, 2000 
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Table A2. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable 
Observa-
tions 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Growth 
 
144 -1.2667 8.4250 -35.2000 11.4000 
Initial Per-
Capita GDP 144 2.1439 .04304 2.0548 2.2357 
Initial 
Human 
Capital 
138 0.8707 0.0992 0.5700 1.000 
Domestic 
Investment 144 0.2161 0.0542 0.1118 0.3799 
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
144 0.03145 0.0291 0.0001 0.1207 
Government 
consumptio
n 
144 0.1794 .0422 0.0975 0.2881 
Current 
Account 144 -0.1109 0.2205 -1.8116 0.5797 
Black 
Market 
Premium 
144 1116.6530 787.1757 27 1828 
Structural 
Index 144 0.6849 0.1741 0.13 0.93 
Transition 
Index 144 2.9542 0.5103 1.5 3.7 
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Table A3. Additional Summary Statistics on Growth and FDI 
Variables 
GDP Growth 
% 
FDI to GDP 
Ratio  
C
ou
nt
ry
 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
 
Pe
rio
d 
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Armenia 6 1994-1999 5.333 1.705 0.044 0.042 
Belarus 8 1992-1999 -1.525 9.061 0.016 0.018 
Bulgaria 9 1991-1999 -5.200 6.650 0.026 0.024 
Czech Rep. 8 1993-2000 1.625 2.603 0.051 0.037 
Estonia 8 1992-1999 -1.175 9.972 0.075 0.024 
Hungary 10 1991-2000 0.870 5.195 0.053 0.023 
Kazakhstan 6 1993-1998 -4.967 5.815 0.001 0.001 
Kyrgyz Rep. 6 1994-1999 -0.450 10.941 0.052 0.024 
Latvia 9 1992-1999 -3.222 13.917 0.053 0.023 
Lithuania 8 1993-2000 -1.100 8.092 0.031 0.026 
Macedonia 6 1994-1999 3.283 1.618 0.009 0.011 
Moldova  8 1992-1999 -10.112 12.900 0.031 0.021 
Poland 9 1991-1999 3.667 4.269 0.027 0.015 
Romania 10 1991-2000 -1.750 6.416 0.022 0.019 
Russia 9 1992-2000 -3.744 7.683 0.013 0.006 
Slovak Rep. 8 1993-2000 3.712 3.559 0.029 0.036 
Slovenia 8 1993-2000 4.238 0.857 0.018 0.004 
Ukraine 8 1992-1999 -10.200 7.967 0.016 0.005 
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Table A4. Comparative Specifications using OLS (robust) Estimation on Pooled Data 
Independent 
Variable 
MODEL 1:     
Direct Effect  
of FDI on 
Growth  
without 
Synergies 
MODEL 2:      
FDI-Human 
Capital 
Synergy 
without a  
Direct Effect 
MODEL 3:      
FDI-Domestic 
Investment 
Synergy 
without a   
Direct Effect 
MODEL 4:   
FDI-Human 
Capital 
Synergy      
with a       
Direct Effect 
MODEL 5:    
FDI-Domestic 
Investment 
Synergy      
with a       
Direct Effect 
MODEL 6:  
Both FDI 
Synergies   
with a       
Direct Effect  
of FDI  
Initial GDP Per 
Capita,1989 
-0.1361 
(0.09)* 
-0.0148 
(0.58) 
-0.1384 
(0.51) 
-0.0183 
(0.52) 
-0.1339 
(0.56) 
-0.1547 
(0.53) 
Initial Human 
Capital,1989 
0.1018 
(0.27) 
0.0880 
(0.34) 
0.1053 
(0.25) 
0.1430 
(0.20) 
0.0998 
(0.28) 
0.1368 
(0.25) 
Domestic 
Investment 
0.0483 
(0.75) 
0.0490 
(0.75) 
-0.0101 
(0.95) 
0.0432 
(0.78) 
0.0986 
(0.61) 
0.0669 
(0.74) 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
0.5069 
(0.02)** — — 
1.83689 
(0.35) 
0.8999 
(0.31) 
1.8561 
(0.34) 
FDI*Human 
Capital — 
0.5422 
(0.03)** — 
-1.4793 
(0.50) — 
-1.3100 
(0.63) 
FDI*Domestic 
Investment — — 
2.0044 
(0.02)** — 
-1.6984 
(0.63) 
-0.7389 
(0.86) 
Government 
Consumption 
0.3411 
(0.05)** 
0.3272 
(0.07)* 
0.3318 
(0.05)** 
0.3826 
(0.06)* 
0.3491 
(0.06)* 
0.3803 
(0.06)* 
Current 
Account 
-0.0288 
(0.51) 
-0.0292 
(0.53) 
-0.0299 
(0.51) 
-0.0280 
(0.54) 
-0.0279 
(0.54) 
-0.0276 
(0.54) 
Black Market 
Premium 
-0.0001 
(0.00)** 
-0.0001 
(0.00)** 
-0.0001 
(0.00)** 
-0.0001 
(0.00)** 
-0.0001 
(0.12) 
-0.0001 
(0.09)* 
Constant 0.1526 (0.74) 
0.0023 
(0.99) 
0.1705 
(0.71) 
-0.0249 
(0.89) 
0.1372 
(0.76) 
0.1507 
(0.75) 
Observations 138 138 138 138 138 138 
 Note: p-values in parentheses; * - significance at 10%; ** - significance at 5%. 
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Table A5. Granger Causality 
Dependent Variable  
Growth FDI Growth FDI 
 Independent estimation System estimation 
Lagged FDI 14.93 
t= (0.83) 
P= (0.41) 
0.63 
t= (8.59) 
P= (0.00) 
14.92 
z= (0.84) 
P= (0.401) 
0.63 
z= (8.69) 
P= (0.00) 
Lagged 
Growth 
0.466 
t= (8.21) 
P= (0.00) 
0.0002 
t= (1.27) 
P= (0.21) 
0.46 
z= (8.31) 
P= (0.00) 
0.0002 
z= (1.29) 
P= (0.19) 
Constant 0.61 
t= (0.81) 
P= (0.419) 
0.14 
t= (4.77) 
P= (0.00) 
0.61 
z= (0.82) 
P= (0.41) 
0.014 
z= (4.83) 
P= (0.000) 
Number of 
observations 126 126 126 126 
 F (2, 123): 
36.36 
(0.00) 
F (2, 123): 
40.91 
(0.00) 
Joint Test: 
[FDI] Lagged Growth = 0.0 
[Growth] Lagged FDI = 0.0 
?2(2) = 2.4; Prob > ?2=0.3 
 
